NOT SO REPLACEABLE

 

NOT SO REPLACEABLE

  

for submission to

Joint Force Quarterly

   

 

  

Kyle P. Hahn, Maj, USMC

Nathan D. Olin, MAJ, USA

Benjamin C. Rich, Maj, USAF

  

  

  

Joint Forces Staff College

Joint and Combined Warfighting School  

Class #18-B

30 Oct 2018

  

  

Faculty Advisor: Jason K. Brandt, CDR, USN

Seminar #9

  

A submission to the Faculty of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements for Joint Professional Military Education Phase  II.  The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

               

Abstract

The United States’ military manpower system of the last half century is struggling to stay competitive with the challenges of the future. Numerous changes have been implemented to update the way personnel are recruited, retained, and how careers are managed; yet, the 2018 National Defense Strategy still identifies the need for more effective management of personnel and talent across the services. The issue is put in context with the concept of “replaceability” as a lens through which to examine structure and culture surrounding military manpower. The manpower paradigms must shift towards less replaceability to effectively adapt to the challenges of the future.

               

Not So Replaceable

War Requires People

Manpower is an unchanging constant in conflict; war requires people. However, the utilization, employment, and management of humans has changed significantly over time. As the contextual environment, force structure, and institutional culture changes; so does the military manpower system. While the United States military seeks to remain forward-focused and prepared for the future battlefield, it is becoming increasingly clear that the manpower system of the last half century is struggling to stay relevant. Numerous changes have been implemented to update the way personnel are recruited, retained, and how careers are managed; yet, the 2018 National Defense Strategy still identifies the need for “broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services” to improve development of leaders.¹ Discussions among military senior leaders include the need for an improved military manpower system to keep the force ready for future conflict, and the upcoming implementation of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) appears to be the next installment of change in that arena; however, most efforts are just giving attention to the symptoms of a much larger issue.

The United States military manpower policies established at the end of

World War II, and updated in the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), are no longer proving effective with modern societal challenges, and future conflicts that may require new ways to fight. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford described the changing strategic landscape by stating, “While the fundamental nature of war has not changed, the pace of change and modern technology, coupled with shifts in the nature of geopolitical competition, have altered the character of war in the 21st century.” General Dunford goes on to say, “To arrest and, in time, reverse the erosion of our competitive advantage, our force development and design processes must deliver a Joint Force capable of competing and winning against any potential adversary.”² 

While there are many components to building a manpower system capable of meeting the changes in warfare, paradigms must first shift in the areas of manpower structure and culture. These issues are addressed by identifying barriers to improving the military manpower system as it relates to leading and driving change in the officer population.  Recommending solutions pave the way for larger changes across the entire system. To discuss these issues it is important to provide context by explaining the “continuum of replaceability” and a brief history of the United States military manpower system. 

Replaceability and History

To understand the root cause of the military’s dated manpower system, Figure 1 assists in illustrating the underlying mindset on a “continuum of replaceability” of individual members. At the far left of the continuum, individuals are completely replaceable and at the far right, individuals are not at all replaceable. While the military manpower paradigm is not at either extreme of the continuum, it can be argued that it is farther to the left than to the right. For various reasons, the United States’ military manpower replaceability slider has been moving away from the left of the continuum since the end of World War II. 

Figure 1. Continuum of Replaceability

At the end of World War II the United States was a newly born superpower operating with largely inferior policies, structures, and systems to manage the relatively massive force. For example, the Army and Navy operated independent from each other, each having their own business rules. Congress sought uniformity and as a result, many aspects within the Department of Defense experienced changes.³

In regard to officer manpower, Congress drafted legislation that would; (1) create uniform rules for officer management, (2) promote a young and vigorous officer corps, and (3) retain the capacity to rapidly mobilize if necessary.⁴ These basic premises set into place the structure and culture that remain today, promoting a specific demographic: young, single, and male.⁵ The 1947 Officer Personnel Act formalized and established the same rules for all the services. The 1954 Officer Grade Limitation Act sought to further remedy issues from post-World War II.⁶ The “Up-or-Out” system was formally implemented across all services as well.

While continuing to modernize the force and adapt to social changes, the all volunteer force was established in 1973. The all-volunteer force resulted in significant changes that are still being observed today. The average age of military personnel has increased, “the average military officer was roughly 34.5 years old in 2015, up from 32.1 in 1973, and the average enlisted member was just over age 27 in 2015, compared with age 25 in 1973.”⁷ At the end of the draft, women represented two percent of the military, in 2018, it is closer to 15 percent. Marital status increased from 40 percent to 70 percent.⁸ Education level has increased across the board as well, 45 percent of the enlisted force had high school diplomas in 1973, compared to 2017, where it is 92 percent. Military officers are four times as likely as their civilian counterparts to have completed a postgraduate degree.⁹ These improvements in education, age, gender, and marital status are generally agreed to be positive outcomes. 

The last major change to the United States military manpower system was the 1980 DOPMA. Since the implementation of the all-volunteer force, Congress had concerns about “loss of talent” from perceived inequalities in the promotion system.¹⁰ “DOPMA established a common officer management system built around a uniform notion of how military officers should be trained, appointed, promoted, separated, and retired.”¹¹ Minor changes to DOPMA were made in 1990 and 2006, mostly concerning Reduction-in-Force tools. Table 1 summarizes the various congressional acts and the related provisions.

 

Table 1. Evolution of DOMPA Provisions¹²

Structure

For the most part, the structure of the military manpower system is designed to produce officers who command young, minimally-trained formations in large scale ground conflicts.¹³ This system still harkens back to a time when manpower replaceability was valued over individual competence and technical skill. This puts the emphasis of recruiting on quantity to meet current military requirements, and the qualities necessary for promotion are strictly tied to time-in-service and time-in grade policies. This structure has led to a force that is struggling to meet personnel demands in a complicated environment defined by a more persistent and more complex conflict. The methods used to address the management and potential shortfalls of talent within the force must be further challenged by examining the institutional promotion framework. 

The 2018 National Defense Strategy cites a need to cultivate workforce talent and calls for “broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services” to improve development of leaders.¹⁴ The use of the term “broad revision” indicates an overall military manpower structure that must be addressed to better manage personnel. Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral Robert Burke stated, “The trends are clear. We are in a war for talent.”¹⁵ Our senior leaders are beginning to recognize the need to move to the right on the continuum of replaceability.

From a manpower standpoint, gaining and maintaining a competitive advantage is becoming more about the people and organizations that enable advancement in the current operating environment.¹⁶ The military can no longer be end-strength driven and simply fill requirements based on rank and MOS alone. The legacy manpower paradigm is being questioned. The Army, for example, is engaged in a long-overdue reconstruction of their talent management process. This redesign of the way talent is managed is being emplaced to address the manning updates needed to achieve the Army’s number one priority which is readiness. These changes hinge on a system that can describe a Soldier beyond their basic branch and considers more variables such as knowledge, skills, and behaviors as factors for filling positions in the force.¹⁷ For these changes to truly make a lasting difference they must coincide with structural reform that acknowledges the individual as a resource that is not easily replaced.

The need for skills and expertise outside the traditional military functions is not a new concept.  The military brings in specialists in fields such as medical and law to give the military an organic capability in those areas. Language in the 2019 NDAA allows for the expansion of outsourcing expertise and technical fields such as cyber are believed to be the primary starting points.¹⁸ This challenges the long standing DOPMA policies that keep the military a closed system in most military occupations where very little regard is given to training and expertise gained in the civilian sector.¹⁹ 

While technical fields (i.e. cyber) raise the most immediate concerns about the outdated military manpower structure, there are other examples where shortfalls have been identified. Efforts to relieve manpower tension sometimes do not fit the military way of doing business and the efforts do not last. An antiquated structure that fosters the belief that all individuals must be replaceable is partially to blame for modern day military shortfalls. A decade-and-a-half of counter insurgency has seen updates to doctrine that address the nuances of this asymmetric fight. However, the implementation of “Cold War-era personnel and rotation policies” have cut the legs off the effort.²⁰ A tactical key to success is the idea of a partnership and advisory role by the US military with host nation security forces. This strategy was said to have a high priority, but in practice was poorly implemented as units and personnel changed every 6-12 months. 

Efforts to better execute this strategy were created but ultimately undervalued at the ground level. A prime example of this is the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program (AFPAK Hands) designed to raise a group of officers with language skills who are trained to be cultural experts and have the opportunity to build long term relationships with Afghan partners. Despite the emphasis on the importance of this mission, the execution did not fit the military structure and the idea failed. Thomas E. Ricks in his article “Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan” states about AFPAK Hands, “Despite the fanfare and stated importance of the program, mismanagement, and misutilization where rampant as this specialized cadre encountered personnel systems unable to support non-traditional career paths. Caught between career managers that saw the program as a deviation from what officers ‘should’ be doing – leading tactical units – and a deployment system that often leads to random staff assignments instead of partnered roles with Afghan leaders, the program quickly became known as an assignment to be ‘survived’ if not avoided.”²¹ Raising and maintaining enduring expertise that is resident within the military is not a quick and simple process and the current military manpower structure is not conducive to this end state.

The commonly-heard story of a native foreign language speaking service member being assigned to somewhere completely not in-line with their inherent skill, should not be heard as a joke, but as an explicit system failure. JP 1-0 states, "Language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness skills are vital enablers of joint operations... language and regional experts play a critical role in day-to-day operation... Language and regional expertise skills can save lives and ensure mission accomplishment throughout confrontation, conflict, and stabilization operations.”²² Until the manpower management systems are in place to account for talent in greater detail than rank and MOS, the system will continue to struggle.  

Talent must not just be managed, but recruited, developed, and retained to help strengthen the relationship between those who are brought in for service and the capacity in which they serve. Under DOPMA the military promotes from within in a bottom up model on a tightly prescribed timeline. Once an officer fails to promote they can be forced out of the service.²³ The entire premise of officer promotions is being challenged and the 2019 NDAA opens the door to recruitment of qualified civilians up to the rank of O-6 and potentially ending the ”Up-or-Out” construct for officers with specific skills.²⁴ It must be recognized as well that expertise and talent cannot always be developed at the rate prescribed in the time in service and time in grade requirements. Some technical fields, such as space and cyber, require specialized knowledge and experience that take time to acquire. Similarly other fields such as those that require strategic thinking, or cultural and language expertise, need to allow officers to stay in a grade long enough to receive the necessary military or civilian training without a detriment to future promotion potential. These reasons justify changes to the structure of how manpower is accessed, trained, and retained such as the 2019 NDAA, but another obstacle to progressing beyond the legacy manpower paradigm of replaceability is culture.

Culture

Perhaps the biggest reason structural changes intended to move the manpower paradigm further right on the continuum of replaceability fail is when they conflict with military culture. Strategies that have been undertaken to promote the evolution of the manpower system from its legacy posture of attrition-based warfare to a modern system capable of meeting today’s security challenges often do things that go against military members’ identity and traditions. So while strategies may be designed to bring about change, culture eats strategy for breakfast. Trying to move away from a system of the past will meet resistance.²⁵ Unless cultural inertia is respected and overcome, it will remain an ongoing problem that can doom any strategy to failure. 

Some artifacts of service cultures regarding manpower are the slogans we use as shortcuts for understanding the vague, often labyrinthine system of accessions, training, promotions, and retention that create the totality of the manpower cloud. Consider the axioms ‘Every Marine a rifleman’, ‘deploy or get out’, and ‘the needs of the service’. These phrases all have roots in the left side of the continuum of replaceability. The best way to evaluate these norms of military culture is to express them in terms of opportunity cost. 

‘Every Marine a rifleman’ means that every single person in the United States Marine Corps spends dedicated time practicing and maintaining rifle skills. This time alone is a significant burden that cannot be overlooked and may be unnecessary for many professions. Perhaps also there are very capable men and women with a very specialized and highly-valuable skill set that, for whatever reason, are not good riflemen. Does the culture tolerate these and allow them to remain for their other, more relevant skills? Senior Marine Corps leaders believe to compromise on this principle for the sake of accessing and retaining top talent will “erode the trust that is imbibed through the shared experience of having gone through all of the physical and military training.”²⁶ In other words the threat to the cultural identity of the force is believed to be greater than the need to shift the paradigm to the right on the continuum of replaceability. 

The slogan ‘Deploy or get out’ is a manifestation of the leftward-leaning replaceability paradigm. It stems from the underlying belief that some jobs in the military are more difficult or painful than others and that we have a pact to spread the burden evenly across the force. If someone, for whatever reason, is not able to deploy, that increases the burden on the other members of the service and fosters a feeling of inequality or that someone isn’t, “pulling their weight.” While this policy could enhance morale, the opportunity cost that must be considered is the contribution, training, and experience of tens of thousands of non-deployable members who contribute to the joint team that would be lost if they were to be forced out due to their readiness status.²⁷

Saying ‘the needs of the service’ is usually used as a shortcut for telling an individual that their needs must be subordinate to the coincidence or timing of what the service needs right now. This axiom is a manifestation of a left-leaning paradigm on the replaceability continuum. The assumption is that since everyone is replaceable, that it doesn’t matter as much what an individual’s preferences, skills, or qualifications are as much as that whatever “must fill” job is on top of the pile gets a body.²⁸ The opportunity cost of a ‘the needs of the service’ approach is that the system is biased towards filling the highest priority positions with anyone rather than finding and retaining the right people for the right jobs. Is that a cost we can continue to pay as our adversaries catch up to us? What would it look like if high performing people were allowed to continue to excel in their current job rather than being forced to PCS? Or if skill sets, background, training, and developmental path were weighed more heavily in highly-technical career fields than career progression, timing, and ‘the needs of the service’?  

While component services define concrete parameters for developmental career paths, cultural norms that are not part of the formal structure can heavily effect the outcome for an individual. For instance there is a cultural stigma against staying in one place too long (colloquial: “homesteading”). Members who don’t move every three years or less could be seen as “hiding” and thus be considered less competitive for promotion.²⁹ And while there are many valid reasons for the rapid pace of military rotations, the constant churn of manpower rotation has many opportunity costs aside from the PCS budget that are rarely considered. Frequent turnover causes drops in productivity at both ends of a tour of duty. The loss of skills, knowledge and talent from forcing someone at peak productivity to leave their job is also a cost that is not sufficiently counted under the current paradigm.

The policies and rigid structure established over half a century ago are struggling to remain relevant. Many policy changes and programs have been implemented to amend this gap; however, many “solutions” appear to only target the symptoms of a bigger issue. The rules established in 1947 still disproportionately target young, unmarried males. This bias is most easily observed with the expectation of frequent moves, often every two to three years. Frequent moves are less disruptive to unmarried individuals than those who are married. A secondary effect of frequent moves is that the spouse is often unable to gain long term employment or creditability

An example of only treating the symptom is observed with the creation of the Career Intermission Program (CIP). Since the military manpower system is so rigid that any deviation would be career ending. The CIP was created in an attempt to retain talent while promoting life / work balance.³⁰ By the creation of such a program, it is openly acknowledged that the military does not provide a quality life / work balance for today’s military member. Until the key components of the original Officer Personnel Act of 1947 are reevaluated, all the “solutions” will only treat symptoms. 

Today’s military and the military of the future cannot operate in a system designed in 1947. A shift in balance needs to adjust for today’s force which seeks diversity, is older, and has a family. An acknowledgement of the current cultural bias must be made, adjusting for what the future military actually must be, ultimately resulting in a shift to the right on the continuum of replaceability.

Conclusion

The United States military manpower policies established at the end of World War II, and updated in 1980 with DOPMA, are struggling to remain relevant with the increasing challenges that require skill and experience to navigate. Viewing the military manpower system through the “continuum of replaceability” lens assists with identifying the past and the direction we are headed. The main issues hindering progress are structure and culture.

Current structure of the military system harkens back to a time when manpower replaceability was valued over individual competence and technical skill. Now the force is struggling to meet personnel demands in a complicated environment defined by a more persistent and more complex conflict. We are in a war for talent and doing a poor job at managing it. Until the manpower management systems are in place to account for talent in greater detail than rank and MOS, the system will continue to struggle. It must also be recognized that expertise and talent cannot always be developed at the rate prescribed in the time in service and time in grade requirements.

Culture is the largest issue to face when seeking to change military manpower. Organizations that stemmed from attrition-based warfare to a modern system capable of meeting today’s security challenges will face issues that go against military members’ identity and traditions. An honest evaluation of cultural norms compared against opportunity cost highlights issues. Additionally, there have been many policy changes to try and remedy issues; however, many “solutions” appear to only target the symptoms of a bigger issue. The military of the future cannot operate in a system designed primarily for young, unmarried males. A shift in balance needs to adjust for today’s force which seeks diversity, is older, and has a family.

Figure 2. Shifting of the Military Manpower Paradigm on the Continuum of Replaceability

Over time the military manpower paradigm has shifted right on the continuum of replaceability, as identified in Figure 2, to adapt to increasing technological complexity in warfighting, the challenges of asymmetric warfare, and shifting societal values. The military manpower paradigm is still too far to the left on the replaceability continuum, but lawmakers are working with military leaders to evolve our manpower system into one that can access, train, and retain warfighters who will succeed in the defense mission of tomorrow.

 

               

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¹ 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary. p. 7-8. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf  ² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford. “Gen. Dunford: The Character of War &

Strategic Landscape Have Changed”. DoD Live, posted April 30, 2018 by Katie Lange. Accessed 18 October 2018. http://www.dodlive.mil/2018/04/30/dunford-the-character-of-war-strategiclandscape-have-changed/ 

³ National Security Act of 1947. Office of the Historian, US Department of State. Accessed 18 October

2018. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act

⁴                                 McKenzie, Thurman. "The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act – the Army's Challenge to Contemporary Officer Management". School of Advanced Military Studies. Page ii.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545125

⁵                                 Misztal, Blaise; Rametta, Jack; Farrell, Mary. “Personnel Reform Lives, But Don’t Call It ‘Force Of The Future’”. War on the Rocks. University of Texas. 9 August 2018. Accessed 17 October 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/personnel-reform-lives-but-dont-call-it-force-of-the-future/  ⁶ McKenzie, Thurman. "The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act – the Army's Challenge to Contemporary Officer Management". School of Advanced Military Studies. Retrieved 17 October 2018.

Page 6. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545125  

⁷   Parker, Kim; Cilluffo, Anthony; Stepler, Renee. ”6 Facts About the US Military and its Changing Demographics”. Pew Research Center. 13 April 2017. Accessed 17 October 2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/13/6-facts-about-the-u-s-military-and-itschanging-demographics/  

⁸   Rostker, Bernard. ”The Evoluation of the All Volunteer Force“. RAND. 2006. Accessed 17 October

2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9195.html  

⁹                                 Parker, Kim; Cilluffo, Anthony; Stepler, Renee. ”6 Facts About the US Military and its Changing Demographics”. Pew Research Center. 13 April 2017. Accessed 17 October 2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/13/6-facts-about-the-u-s-military-and-itschanging-demographics/  

¹⁰                             Rostker, Bernard, “Changing the Officer Personnel System,” in Filling the Ranks, ed. Cindy Williams (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 151.

¹¹                             Rostker, Bernard; Thie, Harry; Lacy, James, Kawata, Jennifer; Purnell, Susanna., “The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 7.

¹²                             McKenzie, Thurman. "The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act – the Army's Challenge to Contemporary Officer Management". School of Advanced Military Studies. Retrieved 17 October 2018.

Page 13. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545125  

¹³                             Misztal, Blaise; Rametta, Jack; Farrell, Mary. “Personnel Reform Lives, but Don’t Call It ‘Force of the Future”. War On The Rocks. August 9, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/personnelreform-lives-but-dont-call-it-force-of-the-future/  ¹⁴ 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary. p. 7-8. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf  ¹⁵ Welna, David. ”Military Introduces Promotion Changes In Attempt to Attract and Keep Better Officers”. NPR. 4 September 2018. Accessed 18 October 2018.

https://www.npr.org/2018/09/04/644618088/military-introduces-promotion-changes-inattempt-to-attract-and-keep-better-offi   

                                                                                                                                                                     

¹⁶   Blanken, Leo; Lepore, Jason; Rodriguez, Stephen. “America’s Military is Choking on Old Technology”. FP, January 29, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/29/americas-military-ischoking-on-old-technology/  

¹⁷   Dilanian, Arpi; Akowowo, Taiwo. “Q&A: The Army's new talent management system”. army.mil,

January 30, 2017,

https://www.army.mil/article/181517/qa_the_armys_new_talent_management_system  

¹⁸   Shane, Leo. ”Congress is giving the officer promotion system a massive overhaul”. Military Times, July 25, 2018. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/07/25/how-officers-arepromoted-will-get-its-biggest-overhaul-in-decades-heres-what-that-means-for-the-military/  ¹⁹ Parcell, Ann; Krause, Amanda. ”Recommendations from the CNGR Implementation Plan: Exploring the Requirements of DOPMA and ROPMA”. CNA Analysis & Solutions, January 2010. ²⁰ Ricks, Thomas. ”Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan,” FP, December 28, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/28/our-generals-failed-in-afghanistan-2/  ²¹ Ricks, Thomas. ”Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan,” FP, December 28, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/28/our-generals-failed-in-afghanistan-2 

²²   JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 31 May 2016. P-1.

²³   Parcell, Ann; Krause, Amanda. ”Recommendations from the CNGR Implementation Plan: Exploring the Requirements of DOPMA and ROPMA”. CNA Analysis & Solutions, January 2010.  

²⁴   Shane, Leo. ”Congress is giving the officer promotion system a massive overhaul”. Military Times, July 25, 2018. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/07/25/how-officers-arepromoted-will-get-its-biggest-overhaul-in-decades-heres-what-that-means-for-the-military/  ²⁵ Dunivin, Karen. ”Military culturue: a paradigm shift?”. Air University Press, 1997, 27-28.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/maxwell/mp10.pdf 

²⁶   Shogol, Jeff. ”Every Marine A rifleman no more?”. Marine Times, 7 May 2017.

https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2017/05/07/every-marine-arifleman-no-more/  

²⁷   Copp, Tara. ”126,000 service members in crosshairs for separation as DoD’s ’deploy or get out’ policy takes effect”. Military Times, 2 Oct 2018. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2018/10/02/126000-service-members-in-crosshairs-for-separation-as-deploy-or-get-outtakes-effect/  

²⁸   USAF public recruiting website. ”Do I have any say about where I will be assigned?”. Accessed 18 Oct 2018.  https://www.airforce.com/frequently-asked-questions/how-things-work,locationassignment,assignment/do-i-have-any-say-about-where-i-will-be-assigned  

²⁹   Lundquist, Jennifer; Zhun, Xu. “Reinstitutionalizing Families: Life Course Policy and Marriage in the Military”. Journal of Marriage & Family 76, no. 5 (October 2014). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jomf.12131

³⁰   Maucinone, Scott. “Why are so few troops signing up for one of DoD’s most flexible personnel pilot programs?”. Federal News Network. 3 April 2018. Accessed 18 October 2018.

https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2018/04/taking-a-break-why-one-of-dodsflagship-personnel-programs-is-struggling/