NOT SO REPLACEABLE
NOT SO
REPLACEABLE
for
submission to
Joint
Force Quarterly
Kyle P.
Hahn, Maj, USMC
Nathan D.
Olin, MAJ, USA
Benjamin
C. Rich, Maj, USAF
Joint
Forces Staff College
Joint and Combined Warfighting School
Class
#18-B
30 Oct
2018
Faculty
Advisor: Jason K. Brandt, CDR, USN
Seminar #9
A submission to the Faculty
of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II.
The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original
views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the
Department of Defense.
Abstract
The United States’ military manpower system of the
last half century is struggling to stay competitive with the challenges of the
future. Numerous changes have been implemented to update the way personnel are
recruited, retained, and how careers are managed; yet, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy still identifies the need for more effective management of
personnel and talent across the services. The issue is put in context with the
concept of “replaceability” as a lens through which to examine structure and
culture surrounding military manpower. The manpower paradigms must shift
towards less replaceability to effectively adapt to the challenges of the
future.
Not So
Replaceable
War Requires People
Manpower is an unchanging constant in conflict; war
requires people. However, the utilization, employment, and management of humans
has changed significantly over time. As the contextual environment, force
structure, and institutional culture changes; so does the military manpower
system. While the United States military seeks to remain forward-focused and
prepared for the future battlefield, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
manpower system of the last half century is struggling to stay relevant. Numerous
changes have been implemented to update the way personnel are recruited,
retained, and how careers are managed; yet, the 2018 National Defense Strategy
still identifies the need for “broad revision of talent management among the
Armed Services” to improve development of leaders.1 Discussions
among military senior leaders include the need for an improved military
manpower system to keep the force ready for future conflict, and the upcoming
implementation of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) appears to
be the next installment of change in that arena; however, most efforts are just
giving attention to the symptoms of a much larger issue.
The United States military manpower policies established at
the end of
World War II, and updated in the 1980
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), are no longer proving
effective with modern societal challenges, and future conflicts that may require
new ways to fight. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph
Dunford described the changing strategic landscape by stating, “While the
fundamental nature of war has not changed, the pace of change and modern
technology, coupled with shifts in the nature of geopolitical competition, have
altered the character of war in the 21st century.” General Dunford goes on to
say, “To arrest and, in time, reverse the erosion of our competitive advantage,
our force development and design processes must deliver a Joint Force capable
of competing and winning against any potential adversary.”2
While there are many components to building a
manpower system capable of meeting the changes in warfare, paradigms must first
shift in the areas of manpower structure and culture. These issues are
addressed by identifying barriers to improving the military manpower system as
it relates to leading and driving change in the officer population. Recommending solutions pave the way for
larger changes across the entire system. To discuss these issues it is
important to provide context by explaining the “continuum of replaceability”
and a brief history of the United States military manpower system.
Replaceability and History
To understand the root cause of the military’s dated
manpower system, Figure 1 assists in illustrating the underlying mindset on a
“continuum of replaceability” of individual members. At the far left of the
continuum, individuals are completely replaceable and at the far right,
individuals are not at all replaceable. While the military manpower paradigm is
not at either extreme of the continuum, it can be argued that it is farther to
the left than to the right. For various reasons, the United States’ military
manpower replaceability slider has been moving away from the left of the
continuum since the end of World War II.
Figure 1. Continuum of Replaceability
At the end of World War II the United States was a
newly born superpower operating with largely inferior policies, structures, and
systems to manage the relatively massive force. For example, the Army and Navy
operated independent from each other, each having their own business rules.
Congress sought uniformity and as a result, many aspects within the Department
of Defense experienced changes.3
In regard to officer manpower, Congress drafted
legislation that would; (1) create uniform rules for officer management, (2)
promote a young and vigorous officer corps, and (3) retain the capacity to
rapidly mobilize if necessary.4 These basic premises set into place
the structure and culture that remain today, promoting a specific demographic:
young, single, and male.5 The 1947 Officer Personnel Act formalized
and established the same rules for all the services. The 1954 Officer Grade
Limitation Act sought to further remedy issues from post-World War II.6
The “Up-or-Out” system was formally implemented across all services as well.
While continuing to modernize the force and adapt to
social changes, the all volunteer force was established in 1973. The all-volunteer
force resulted in significant changes that are still being observed today. The
average age of military personnel has increased, “the average military officer
was roughly 34.5 years old in 2015, up from 32.1 in 1973, and the average
enlisted member was just over age 27 in 2015, compared with age 25 in 1973.”7
At the end of the draft, women represented two percent of the military, in
2018, it is closer to 15 percent. Marital status increased from 40 percent to
70 percent.8 Education level has increased across the board as well,
45 percent of the enlisted force had high school diplomas in 1973, compared to
2017, where it is 92 percent. Military officers are four times as likely as
their civilian counterparts to have completed a postgraduate degree.9
These improvements in education, age, gender, and marital status are generally
agreed to be positive outcomes.
The last major change to the United States military
manpower system was the 1980 DOPMA. Since the implementation of the
all-volunteer force, Congress had concerns about “loss of talent” from
perceived inequalities in the promotion system.10 “DOPMA established
a common officer management system built around a uniform notion of how
military officers should be trained, appointed, promoted, separated, and
retired.”11 Minor changes to DOPMA were made in 1990 and 2006,
mostly concerning Reduction-in-Force tools. Table 1 summarizes the various
congressional acts and the related provisions.
Table 1. Evolution of DOMPA Provisions12
Structure
For the most part, the structure of the military
manpower system is designed to produce officers who command young,
minimally-trained formations in large scale ground conflicts.13 This
system still harkens back to a time when manpower replaceability was valued
over individual competence and technical skill. This puts the emphasis of
recruiting on quantity to meet current military requirements, and the qualities
necessary for promotion are strictly tied to time-in-service and time-in grade
policies. This structure has led to a force that is struggling to meet
personnel demands in a complicated environment defined by a more persistent and
more complex conflict. The methods used to address the management and potential
shortfalls of talent within the force must be further challenged by examining
the institutional promotion framework.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy cites a need to
cultivate workforce talent and calls for “broad revision of talent management
among the Armed Services” to improve development of leaders.14 The
use of the term “broad revision” indicates an overall military manpower
structure that must be addressed to better manage personnel. Chief of Naval
Personnel, Vice Admiral Robert Burke stated, “The trends are clear. We are in a
war for talent.”15 Our senior leaders are beginning to recognize the
need to move to the right on the continuum of replaceability.
From a manpower standpoint, gaining and maintaining a
competitive advantage is becoming more about the people and organizations that
enable advancement in the current operating environment.16 The
military can no longer be end-strength driven and simply fill requirements
based on rank and MOS alone. The legacy manpower paradigm is being questioned.
The Army, for example, is engaged in a long-overdue reconstruction of their
talent management process. This redesign of the way talent is managed is being
emplaced to address the manning updates needed to achieve the Army’s number one
priority which is readiness. These changes hinge on a system that can describe
a Soldier beyond their basic branch and considers more variables such as
knowledge, skills, and behaviors as factors for filling positions in the force.17
For these changes to truly make a lasting difference they must coincide with
structural reform that acknowledges the individual as a resource that is not
easily replaced.
The need for skills and expertise outside the
traditional military functions is not a new concept. The military brings in specialists in fields
such as medical and law to give the military an organic capability in those
areas. Language in the 2019 NDAA allows for the expansion of outsourcing
expertise and technical fields such as cyber are believed to be the primary
starting points.18 This challenges the long standing DOPMA policies
that keep the military a closed system in most military occupations where very
little regard is given to training and expertise gained in the civilian sector.19
While technical fields (i.e. cyber) raise the most
immediate concerns about the outdated military manpower structure, there are
other examples where shortfalls have been identified. Efforts to relieve
manpower tension sometimes do not fit the military way of doing business and
the efforts do not last. An antiquated structure that fosters the belief that
all individuals must be replaceable is partially to blame for modern day
military shortfalls. A decade-and-a-half of counter insurgency has seen updates
to doctrine that address the nuances of this asymmetric fight. However, the
implementation of “Cold War-era personnel and rotation policies” have cut the
legs off the effort.20 A tactical key to success is the idea of a
partnership and advisory role by the US military with host nation security
forces. This strategy was said to have a high priority, but in practice was
poorly implemented as units and personnel changed every 6-12 months.
Efforts to better execute this strategy were created
but ultimately undervalued at the ground level. A prime example of this is the
Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program (AFPAK Hands) designed to raise a group of
officers with language skills who are trained to be cultural experts and have
the opportunity to build long term relationships with Afghan partners. Despite
the emphasis on the importance of this mission, the execution did not fit the
military structure and the idea failed. Thomas E. Ricks in his article “Our
Generals Failed in Afghanistan” states about AFPAK Hands, “Despite the fanfare
and stated importance of the program, mismanagement, and misutilization where
rampant as this specialized cadre encountered personnel systems unable to
support non-traditional career paths. Caught between career managers that saw
the program as a deviation from what officers ‘should’ be doing – leading
tactical units – and a deployment system that often leads to random staff
assignments instead of partnered roles with Afghan leaders, the program quickly
became known as an assignment to be ‘survived’ if not avoided.”21
Raising and maintaining enduring expertise that is resident within the military
is not a quick and simple process and the current military manpower structure
is not conducive to this end state.
The commonly-heard story of a native foreign language
speaking service member being assigned to somewhere completely not in-line with
their inherent skill, should not be heard as a joke, but as an explicit system
failure. JP 1-0 states, "Language, regional expertise, and cultural
awareness skills are vital enablers of joint operations... language and
regional experts play a critical role in day-to-day operation... Language and
regional expertise skills can save lives and ensure mission accomplishment
throughout confrontation, conflict, and stabilization operations.”22
Until the manpower management systems are in place to account for talent in
greater detail than rank and MOS, the system will continue to struggle.
Talent must not just be managed, but recruited,
developed, and retained to help strengthen the relationship between those who
are brought in for service and the capacity in which they serve. Under DOPMA
the military promotes from within in a bottom up model on a tightly prescribed
timeline. Once an officer fails to promote they can be forced out of the
service.23 The entire premise of officer promotions is being
challenged and the 2019 NDAA opens the door to recruitment of qualified
civilians up to the rank of O-6 and potentially ending the ”Up-or-Out” construct
for officers with specific skills.24 It must be recognized as well
that expertise and talent cannot always be developed at the rate prescribed in
the time in service and time in grade requirements. Some technical fields, such
as space and cyber, require specialized knowledge and experience that take time
to acquire. Similarly other fields such as those that require strategic
thinking, or cultural and language expertise, need to allow officers to stay in
a grade long enough to receive the necessary military or civilian training
without a detriment to future promotion potential. These reasons justify
changes to the structure of how manpower is accessed, trained, and retained
such as the 2019 NDAA, but another obstacle to progressing beyond the legacy
manpower paradigm of replaceability is culture.
Culture
Perhaps the biggest reason structural changes
intended to move the manpower paradigm further right on the continuum of
replaceability fail is when they conflict with military culture. Strategies
that have been undertaken to promote the evolution of the manpower system from
its legacy posture of attrition-based warfare to a modern system capable of
meeting today’s security challenges often do things that go against military
members’ identity and traditions. So while strategies may be designed to bring
about change, culture eats strategy for breakfast. Trying to move away from a
system of the past will meet resistance.25 Unless cultural inertia
is respected and overcome, it will remain an ongoing problem that can doom any
strategy to failure.
Some artifacts of service cultures regarding manpower
are the slogans we use as shortcuts for understanding the vague, often
labyrinthine system of accessions, training, promotions, and retention that
create the totality of the manpower cloud. Consider the axioms ‘Every Marine a
rifleman’, ‘deploy or get out’, and ‘the needs of the service’. These phrases
all have roots in the left side of the continuum of replaceability. The best
way to evaluate these norms of military culture is to express them in terms of
opportunity cost.
‘Every Marine a rifleman’ means that every single
person in the United States Marine Corps spends dedicated time practicing and
maintaining rifle skills. This time alone is a significant burden that cannot
be overlooked and may be unnecessary for many professions. Perhaps also there
are very capable men and women with a very specialized and highly-valuable
skill set that, for whatever reason, are not good riflemen. Does the culture
tolerate these and allow them to remain for their other, more relevant skills?
Senior Marine Corps leaders believe to compromise on this principle for the
sake of accessing and retaining top talent will “erode the trust that is
imbibed through the shared experience of having gone through all of the
physical and military training.”26 In other words the threat to the
cultural identity of the force is believed to be greater than the need to shift
the paradigm to the right on the continuum of replaceability.
The slogan ‘Deploy or get out’ is a manifestation
of the leftward-leaning replaceability paradigm. It stems from the underlying
belief that some jobs in the military are more difficult or painful than others
and that we have a pact to spread the burden evenly across the force. If
someone, for whatever reason, is not able to deploy, that increases the burden
on the other members of the service and fosters a feeling of inequality or that
someone isn’t, “pulling their weight.” While this policy could enhance morale,
the opportunity cost that must be considered is the contribution, training, and
experience of tens of thousands of non-deployable members who contribute to the
joint team that would be lost if they were to be forced out due to their
readiness status.27
Saying ‘the needs of the service’ is usually used as
a shortcut for telling an individual that their needs must be subordinate to
the coincidence or timing of what the service needs right now. This axiom is a
manifestation of a left-leaning paradigm on the replaceability continuum. The
assumption is that since everyone is replaceable, that it doesn’t matter as
much what an individual’s preferences, skills, or qualifications are as much as
that whatever “must fill” job is on top of the pile gets a body.28 The
opportunity cost of a ‘the needs of the service’ approach is that the system is
biased towards filling the highest priority positions with anyone rather than finding and retaining the right people for the right
jobs. Is that a cost we can continue to pay as our adversaries catch up to
us? What would it look like if high performing people were allowed to continue
to excel in their current job rather than being forced to PCS? Or if skill
sets, background, training, and developmental path were weighed more heavily in
highly-technical career fields than career progression, timing, and ‘the needs
of the service’?
While component services define concrete parameters
for developmental career paths, cultural norms that are not part of the formal
structure can heavily effect the outcome for an individual. For instance there
is a cultural stigma against staying in one place too long (colloquial:
“homesteading”). Members who don’t move every three years or less could be seen
as “hiding” and thus be considered less competitive for promotion.29
And while there are many valid reasons for the rapid pace of military
rotations, the constant churn of manpower rotation has many opportunity costs
aside from the PCS budget that are rarely considered. Frequent turnover causes
drops in productivity at both ends of a tour of duty. The loss of skills,
knowledge and talent from forcing someone at peak productivity to leave their
job is also a cost that is not sufficiently counted under the current paradigm.
The policies and rigid structure established over
half a century ago are struggling to remain relevant. Many policy changes and
programs have been implemented to amend this gap; however, many “solutions”
appear to only target the symptoms of a bigger issue. The rules established in
1947 still disproportionately target young, unmarried males. This bias is most
easily observed with the expectation of frequent moves, often every two to
three years. Frequent moves are less disruptive to unmarried individuals than
those who are married. A secondary effect of frequent moves is that the spouse
is often unable to gain long term employment or creditability
An example of only treating the symptom is observed
with the creation of the Career Intermission Program (CIP). Since the military
manpower system is so rigid that any deviation would be career ending. The CIP
was created in an attempt to retain talent while promoting life / work balance.30 By the creation of such
a program, it is openly acknowledged that the military does not provide a quality
life / work balance for today’s military member. Until the key
components of the original Officer Personnel Act of 1947 are reevaluated, all
the “solutions” will only treat symptoms.
Today’s military and the military of the future
cannot operate in a system designed in 1947. A shift in balance needs to adjust
for today’s force which seeks diversity, is older, and has a family. An
acknowledgement of the current cultural bias must be made, adjusting for what
the future military actually must be, ultimately resulting in a shift to the
right on the continuum of replaceability.
Conclusion
The United States military manpower policies
established at the end of World War II, and updated in 1980 with DOPMA, are
struggling to remain relevant with the increasing challenges that require skill
and experience to navigate. Viewing the military manpower system through the
“continuum of replaceability” lens assists with identifying the past and the
direction we are headed. The main issues hindering progress are structure and
culture.
Current structure of the military system harkens back
to a time when manpower replaceability was valued over individual competence
and technical skill. Now the force is struggling to meet personnel demands in a
complicated environment defined by a more persistent and more complex conflict.
We are in a war for talent and doing a poor job at managing it. Until the
manpower management systems are in place to account for talent in greater
detail than rank and MOS, the system will continue to struggle. It must also be
recognized that expertise and talent cannot always be developed at the rate
prescribed in the time in service and time in grade requirements.
Culture is the largest issue to face when seeking to
change military manpower. Organizations that stemmed from attrition-based
warfare to a modern system capable of meeting today’s security challenges will
face issues that go against military members’ identity and traditions. An
honest evaluation of cultural norms compared against opportunity cost
highlights issues. Additionally, there have been many policy changes to try and
remedy issues; however, many “solutions” appear to only target the symptoms of
a bigger issue. The military of the future cannot operate in a system designed
primarily for young, unmarried males. A shift in balance needs to adjust for
today’s force which seeks diversity, is older, and has a family.
Figure 2. Shifting of the Military Manpower Paradigm on the
Continuum of Replaceability
Over time the military manpower paradigm has
shifted right on the continuum of replaceability, as identified in Figure 2, to
adapt to increasing technological complexity in warfighting, the challenges of
asymmetric warfare, and shifting societal values. The military manpower
paradigm is still too far to the left on the replaceability continuum, but
lawmakers are working with military leaders to evolve our manpower system into
one that can access, train, and retain warfighters who will succeed in the
defense mission of tomorrow.
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